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Constitutional Law-THE RIGHTS OF AN UNTENURED TEACHER TO PRO-
CEDURAL DuE PROCESS PRIOR TO DISMISSAL-Roth v. Board of Regents, 408
U.S. 564 (1972).
In the last decade, the federal courts, led by the Supreme Court, have
emphasized the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment as a
basis for an employee's right to procedural due process prior to dismissal
from public employment." The Supreme Court has declared that any gov-
ernmental action to deprive a person of an interest, even a privilege-type
interest, is arbitrary and capricious if not applied with universal evenhanded-
ness3 This holding would seem to entitle almost any teacher summarily
dismissed to procedural due process.
3
However, in the recent case of Board of Regents v. Roth,4 the Supreme
Court reversed a decision of the Seventh Circuit that ordered David Roth,
an untenured teacher in the Wisconsin school system, be accorded minimal
I See generally Davis, The Requirement of a Trial Type Hearing, 70 HARv. L. REv.
193, 233-43 (1956), for a comprehensive discussion of the various procedures used in
dismissal actions. See also Coan, Dismissal of California Probationary Teachers, 15
HAsTiNGs L. J. 284 (1964) (state statutory procedure for dismissal analyzed); Comment,
Dismissals of Public-School Employees in Texas-Suggestions for a More Effective Ad-
ministrative Process, 44 TEXAS L. Rzv. 1309 (1966).
2 See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S 183, 190-91 (1952). This decision, mani-
festing an early trend in favor of the equal protection approach, noted that the gener-
alization that no right to public employment exists, does not logically imply "[tlhat
constitutional protection does [not] extend to a public servant whose exclusion . . .
is patently arbitrary or discriminatory." The culmination of this trend is exemplified
by Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) in which the Court held that welfare
benefits could not be arbitrarily removed without procedural due process, and in
Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 US. 551, 555 (1956) in which the Court noted that
"tio state that a person does not have a constitutional right to government employ-
ment is only to say that he must comply with reasonable, lawful, non-discriminatory
terms laid down by the proper authorities" (teacher in Slocho'wer was tenured). For
a case applying the reasoning to an untenured teacher (of only two months employ-
ment) consult Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1972) (per curiam).
It has been noted that most decisions following this broad equal protection reasoning
also include other reasoning that allows their analysis under other circumventions of the
Privilege Doctrine. See Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. Rv. 1439, 1455 n. 47 (1968).
3 For an effective and exhaustive analysis of the development of the law in this area,
see generally 1 DAvis, ADMINimsrRAT LAW TRA.TisE § 7.12, at 455 (1958); Frakt, Non
Tenure Teachers and the Constitution, 18 KAN. L. REv. 27 (1969); Van Alstyne, The
Consitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE L. J. 841, 858 (1970); Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv.
L. REv. 1439 (1968); Note, The First Amendment and Public Employees-An Emerging
Constitutional Right to be a Policeman?, 37 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 409 (1968).
440 U.SL.W. 5079 (June 29, 1972) (5-3 decision) (Douglas, Marshall, Brennan,
J. J. dissenting) (Powell, J. did not participate) rev'g 446 F. 2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971).
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procedural due process in connection with his dismissal from that system.
Roth was dismissed without notice of the reasons or a hearing on the merits
of the board's decision. Writing for the majority, Justice Stewart relied
on the so-called Privilege Doctrine, which, under a literal reading of the
fourteenth amendment, asserts that public employment is a privilege rather
than a protectable right.5
In attempting to circumvent the Privilege Doctrine, the courts have sought
to find a protectable interest such as a substantive consitutional right. Where
a factual analysis indicates the violation of a substantive constitutional right,
some courts have required procedural protection.6 Still other courts have
required protection prior to dismissal in cases where an employee has been
forced to waive a constitutional right as a condition of public employmentT
Numerous courts have sought to erode the doctrine by finding a protectable
quasi-constitutional interest of liberty or property. Likewise, an expectancy
of continuing employment,8 the expenses, time and effort consumed in
5 Applying the doctrine to public employment in 1892, Justice Holmes noted that
"[There is] no constitutional right to be a policeman." McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford,
155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). For a recent application of the doctrine, see Bailey-
v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1951), aff'd, 341 U.S. 918 (1951).
IThis is accomplished by reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to determine
whether a legitimate basis for the official action exists. Where no basis exists, and a sub-
stantive constitutional right violation is probable, these courts have required procedurar
due process protection. Justice Douglas, concurring in Thorpe v. Housing Authority,.
386 U.S. 670, 678-79 (1967) noted that, "[tlhe recipient of a government benefit ...
cannot be made to forfeit the benefit because he exercises a constitutional right." See,.
e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S.
488 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d
287 (7th Cir. 1968); Johnson .v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966); Gouge v. Joint
School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 984, 991 (W.D. Wisc. 1970); Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp.
112 (D. Mass. 1969); Williams v. Sumter School Dist, 255 F. Supp. 397, 403 (D.S.C
1966).
Some courts have held that a mere allegation of substantive constitutional violation is.
sufficient to entitle a terminated employee to procedural due process. Lucas v. Chapman,
430 F.2d 945 (5th Cir. 1970).
7 Dixon v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 9301
(1961). This case clearly demonstrates the requirement of relinquishment of procedural
due process rights as a condition precedent to a public benefit. Prior to entering a state
university, a student was forced to sign a statement specifying that his attendance at
the university was a privilege rather than a right protectable by procedural due process.
See generally O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with Strings At-
tached, 54 CALn. L. REv. (1966); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARv: L. REvv
1595 (1960).
8 Some courts require only a unilateral expectancy of continuing employment, i.e.,
the employee's subjective, perhaps even unwarranted anticipation of continuing em-
ployment. Orr v. Trinter, 444 F.2d 128 (6th Cir. 1971); Lucas v. Chapman, 430 F.2d
945 (5th Cir. 1970); Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2nd Cir. 1947). Contra, Freeman
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4career preparation or relocation, and other expenses incidental to dismissal
have been deemed sufficient interests in property to warrant protection. In
considering, rights to liberty, the courts have focused on" the right to con-
trhct for future employment. Where dismissal pins a "badge of infamy" on
an employee, diminishing his professional reputation,", or where an em-
ployer admonishes potential employers not to hire his former employee,1'
these courts have found the resulting reduction sufficient to require pro-
cedural due process protection before dismissal. 2
The opinion of the majority in Roth encompasses the entire development
of the law in this area. Initially denouncing the Privilege Doctrine in formal-
ized, rigid form, the Court refuses to abandon it entirely in favor of a non-
literal reading of the fourteenth amendment. Although the Court declares
that a protectable interest of liberty or property must be found, 3 one cari-
not easily determine the exact nature of this interest by a reading of the
Court's opinion.
%'Recognizing that welfare beftefits have been held a protectable property
right in Goldberg v. Kelley,' 4 and agreeing with that holding, the Court
fails. to note the factual parallel between those benefits and the salary of an
untenured teacher. Both originate as government privileges and provide
v.-Gould Special School Dist., 405 F.2d 1153j,1158 (8th Cir. 1969); Jones v. Hopper, 41.0
F.2d 1323, 1328-29 (10th Cir. 1969). Other courts have sought evidence indicating that
the terminated employee's characterization of the existing relationship and reliance
thereon was reasonable. (The absence of a tenure system or acts by the employer induc-
in&.reliance exemplify this.) This de facto tenure has been held a protectable interest.
Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1970); Greene v. Howard Univ, 412 F.2d
1128 (D.C..Cir. 1969).
6 See, e.g., Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 435 F.2d 1182, 1184 (1st Cir. 1970).
1OSee, e.g., Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (security clearance revoked);
.Schwpre v. Board of.Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1956) (license to practice law with-
held); Joint'Anti-fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). But cf. Cafe-
teria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (employee denied procedural due process
after alternative government employment had been secured).
n Birnbium v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966). In this case a doctor charged
with racial bias was prohibited from practicing in one particular hospital. Officials of
that hospital warned other area hospitals not to allow the doctor to practice at their
hospitals. The resulting impairment of reputation and future employability was found
to be a protectable interest in liberty.
12 The courts, seeking to circumvent the Privilege Doctrine by finding these protect-
able interests, often balance the private interest of the dismissed employee against the
public interest. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L. Rrv. 733, 774 (1964), which
iT critical of this balancing. Contra, Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 51 (1961).
"[The decision of the court must depend upon] ... an appropriate weighing of the in-
terests involved."
13 Board of Regents v. Roth, 40 U.SJL.W. 5079, 5080 (US. June 29, 1972).
14 397 US. 254 (1970).
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life's basic necessities, yet the Court declares a teacher's source of subsistence
a non-protectable interest.' 5
Additionally, unilateral expectancy of continued employment, an interest
deemed protectable by other courts,'0 is also rejected. The Court implies
that such an expectancy, if not bilateral, is an unreasonable characterization
of the relationship existing between employer and employee. Roth, an em-
ployee with only one year of employment in the system, was said to have
unreasonably relied on renewal of his contract. Unfortunately, the Court
fails to present a conclusive test to determine at what point, before obtain-
ing tenure, a teacher has an interest that is procedurally protectable. 17
Furthermore, in the principal case, the Court refuses to recognize ter-
mination of an untenured employee without reasons as a hindrance to future
employability, and thus a violation of a right to liberty. The Court states
definitively that a damaging charge must be made by the school adminis-
tration, or that the administration must actively seek to inhibit a former
employee's future career efforts before a right has been violated.' 8 The
Court denies that any stigma on Roth results from his summary dismissal. 19
15 40 U.S.L.W. at 5081 n. 10. The Court takes note of due process protection afforded
in Goldberg, but states that "certain boundaries" have been observed regarding pro-
tectable interests of liberty and property. The analogy between welfare subsistence
payment and a teacher's salary is denied simply, by the Court's silent implication that
an untenured teacher's salary rights fall outside these boundaries.
16 See note 8 supra.
17The companion case to Roth, Perry v. Sindermann, 40 U.S.LW. 5087 (U.S. June
29, 1972) (8-0 decision) (Powell, J. did not participate) offers little help. The Court
held that Sindermann's twelve year service might have constituted a protectable interest.
The Court accepted Sindermann's assertion that, in the absence of any tenure system,
he had reasonably relied on the policy promulgated by the administration in the ODESSA
COLLEGE FAcuLTY GUIDE:
Odessa College has no tenure system. The Administration of the College wishes
the faculty member to feel that he has permanent tenure as long as his teaching
services are satisfactory and as long as he displays a cooperative attitude toward
his co-workers and superiors, and as long as he is happy in his work. Id. at 5089.
Additionally, the Court noted Sindermann's reliance on guidelines established by the
Coordinating Board of the Texas College and University System, which provided that
after seven years, a teacher has some form of job tenure. Thus, it is impossible to con-
clude from this holding that a mere increase in length of service without any of the
elements of de facto tenure will be held a protectable property interest. See note 8
supra.
18 40 U.S.L.W. at 5081.
10 The majority opinion ignores the highly sensitive and specialized nature of the teach-
ing profession, and the effect that a dismissal without reasons can have on any such
vocational career. Accord, Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955) (seaman re-
fused security clearance). The teaching profession is a highly competitive job field.
In such a sensitive profession, potential employers will almost certainly be anxious to
exclude any questionable applicant. Moreover, in such a competitive market situation,
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Moreover, the Court refuses to acknowledge even collaterally the viola-
don of a substantive constitutional right alleged by Roth. Agreeing with Roth
that such a violation entitles any former employee to procedural due process,
the Court nevertheless concludes that the matter should be adjudicated by a
trial court.20 Such an adjudication would have the effect of rendering the
issue of procedural due process moot. Thus, if the teacher prevails, he has
no need for procedural due process on the administrative level, and if he
loses, he has no basis on which it may awarded.
Therefore, the Roth decision apparently rejects the recent trend of the
Court and retreats instead to circumvention of the Privilege Doctrine, there-
by requiring a protectable interest before due process is mandatory. Al-
though one may conclude that a more stringent criteria is established rela-
tive to the existence of such protectable interest, the Court is not definitive,
and leaves to the lower courts and attorneys to speculate at what point such
an interest exists.21 Justice Burger, in a concurring opinion in Perry v.
Sinderman,22 states that the relationship between a teacher and his school
board is essentially a matter of state concern to be determined in state legis-
latures. From this one may infer the desire of the Court to avoid usurpation
of the state legislative function, and even a preference of allowing the states
to conduct their own affairs. Therefore, it is apparent that while no defini-
tive test for a right protectable under the fourteenth amendment emerges in
this decision, the Court's majority rejects the broad equal protection argu-'
ment, and future terminated untenured teachers may well petition a Court
unsympathetic to their cry for procedural due process where none has been
afforded by the state.
N. C. S., Jr.
these employers can afford to exclude a teacher previously dismissed without reasons.
Even assuming that a terminated teacher encounters a sympathetic interviewing er-'
ployer, such an employer will be hindered in hiring effectively without full knowledge
of the circumstances of the applicant's dismissal. See also, Drown v. Portsmouth School
Dist., 435 F.2d 1182, 1182-87 (1st Cir. 1970).
20 40 U.S.L.W. at 5082.
211 Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAV TREA-nSE § 7.20, at 508 (1958). An inquiry is made
into the desirability of a conclusive, definitive test for a protectable interest.
2240 U.S.L.W. 5086; 5090 (U.S. June 29, 1972). (8-0 decision) (Powell, J. did not
participate).
1972]
